Sign artifacts and attestations with Sigstore from PHP — sign, log to Rekor, timestamp, and assemble a bundle
72%
Total Score
60
50
89
80
Three workflows were analyzed with one pull_request_target workflow, but no untrusted checkouts or script-injection patterns were detected. The pull_request_target workflow still warrants review because it can be security-sensitive.
Eight runtime dependencies, including several package-specific Sigstore components, create a meaningful transitive dependency surface that should be reviewed, though the count is not excessive for this functionality.
Only one registry account has publish access. This is a publishing continuity risk for a user-owned project, although repository activity confirms that the account is currently active.
The repository is owned by an individual user rather than an organization, so there is no shown organizational maintenance redundancy to offset the concentrated contributor base.
The package is young at 61 days with 8 releases, including 7 in the last 12 months; this shows active iteration but provides limited long-term maintenance history.
We didn't find any vulnerabilities for this package.
| Dependency | Last Release | Score |
|---|---|---|
k2gl/dsse Version ^1.3 | — | — |
psr/http-client Version ^1.0 | — | — |
psr/http-factory Version ^1.0 | — | — |
psr/http-message Version ^1.1|^2.0 | — | — |
k2gl/rekor-client Version ^1.1 | — | — |
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