Like request, but smaller.
78%
Total Score
healthy
Active releases and strong organization backing outweigh the package-to-repository naming gap.
No build attestation or trusted-publisher identity is present, leaving publication provenance less independently verifiable despite the active project backing.
A prepare script runs during installation, adding build-time behavior and a small amount of supply-chain complexity, but the signal does not indicate a malicious or unusually risky command.
The linked repository name does not match teeny-request and its README does not mention the package, creating uncertainty about whether the repository directly represents this package; the mismatch may also reflect a monorepo.
The audit analyzed 18 of 19 workflows, so coverage is incomplete. It found two high-confidence low-severity adhoc-package installations and one workflow with top-level write permissions, but no unpinned actions or untrusted checkout findings.
We didn't find any vulnerabilities for this package.
| Dependency | Last Release | Score |
|---|---|---|
node-fetch Version ^3.3.2 | — | — |
stream-events Version ^1.0.5 | — | — |
http-proxy-agent Version ^7.0.0 | — | — |
https-proxy-agent Version ^7.0.1 | — | — |
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