AIKIDO-2026-993827
jupyterlab is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
81
CVE Score
High
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
TL;DR
JupyterLab's system clipboard paste path parses clipboard text as cell JSON and inserts the cells without clearing metadata.trusted, so a pasted payload can declare its own output as trusted. JupyterLab does not sanitize trusted output and runs the <script> elements it contains, so pasting the cell runs untrusted JavaScript in the JupyterLab origin. The fix strips the trusted flag from cells pasted through the system clipboard so their output is sanitized like any other externally sourced content.
How do I fix this?
Upgrade the jupyterlab library to the patch version.
Who does this affect?
You are affected if you are using a version that falls within the vulnerable range and you paste notebook cells from the system clipboard with useSystemClipboardForCells enabled.
Package
Versions
4.5.0 - 4.5.10
Fixed in 4.5.114.6.0 - 4.6.3
Fixed in 4.6.4Background info
jupyterlab is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in versions 4.5.0 - 4.5.10 and 4.6.0 - 4.6.3.
Links
GitHub Releases
Fix Commits
github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/1a10a7da5ff655849b21581c2633b46483ae0be9github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/7f9f29e29e0c83fb17b0f11da57d06b3c6a40d96github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/cf6e89a8d315c4134cefa50c220bca296da466a7
Get secure today,
quickly and for free.
Secure your code, cloud, and runtime in one central system. Connect a repo to discover what the reasoning agents find in your codebase.
No credit card required | Scan results in 32 seconds.
I consent to receiving marketing communications based on Aikido’s Privacy Policy.
SOC 2Compliant
ISO 27001CompliantISO 42001Compliant
FedRAMPAuthorized© All Intel data is openly available and commercially licensed.