AIKIDO-2026-273038
rembg is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
53
Medium Risk
This Affects:
rembgTL;DR
The rembg s HTTP server validates the user-supplied ?url= parameter of /api/remove against a private/internal-IP blocklist only on the initial URL, then fetches it with aiohttp using the default allow_redirects=True. A public host that returns an HTTP 3xx redirect to an internal address is followed without re-validation, and the same validate-once pattern is also reachable via DNS rebinding since the connection is not pinned to the validated IP. An unauthenticated remote caller can make the server reach loopback, link-local cloud-metadata (169.254.169.254), and other internal services, bypassing the earlier SSRF control. The fix disables blind redirects, re-validates redirect hops, pins outbound connections to the validated IP via a custom resolver, expands blocked-address checks, and caps the fetched response size.
Who does this affect?
You are affected if you are using a version that falls within the vulnerable range.
Background info
rembg is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in versions 2.0.75 - 2.0.76.
How to fix this
Upgrade the rembg library to the patch version.
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