AIKIDO-2026-106840
requests is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
59
Medium Risk
This Affects:
requestsTL;DR
The should_bypass_proxies logic in requests matches a request host against no_proxy entries using an unanchored suffix comparison. Because the check is greedy and ignores domain boundaries, a host such as evilexample.com is treated as covered by a no_proxy value of example.com. An attacker who controls or influences such a look-alike host can make the client skip the configured proxy and connect directly, bypassing proxy-based egress controls and SSRF protections that rely on no_proxy. The fix ports CPython's bpo-39057 change to constrain no_proxy matching to proper domain boundaries.
Who does this affect?
You are affected if you are using a version that falls within the vulnerable range and rely on no_proxy/NO_PROXY rules to control which hosts bypass the configured proxy.
Background info
requests is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in versions 1.0.0 - 2.33.1.
How to fix this
Upgrade the requests library to the patch version.
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