AIKIDO-2026-10338

TL;DR

Affected versions have two SSRF vectors. In the GraphQL asset mutation (saveAsset), only the hostname of the supplied URL was validated; schemes such as gopher, file, or ftp were not restricted, so an attacker could bypass host-based checks and trigger requests to internal resources. Separately, the control panel resource-JS endpoint (actionResourceJs) accepted a URL, asserted it started with the asset manager base URL, then used Guzzle to fetch that URL and return the response body, so the server could be induced to request arbitrary URLs (e.g. cloud metadata or internal services). The patch adds scheme validation in the GraphQL mutation (only http and https allowed) and changes the resource-JS endpoint to resolve the resource by URI to a local path via App::resourcePathByUri() and serve the file from disk with sendFile(), with no outbound fetch.